Political Economy · Columbia University

Carlo
Prato

Welcome to my website. I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, where I also serve as Deputy Chair. I received a PhD in Economics from Northwestern University in 2012, which makes me an immigrant in two ways. Between 2012 and 2016, I was an Assistant Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. I also held positions at Princeton University and Stanford University. In my research, I study how electoral and legislative institutions shape governance.

Carlo Prato

In progress

Current research

Work on electoral systems, democratic accountability, parties, and political institutions.

Selected record

Publications

Published and forthcoming work, with papers and supplementary materials linked where available.

  1. Executive Power and the Internal Organization of Legislatures, with Costel Andonie and Daniel Diermeier
    Conditionally Accepted, American Journal of Political Science

  2. Politics Transformed? Electoral Competition under Ranked Choice Voting, with Peter Buisseret
    Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science
    Winner of the 2023 “Best APSA Paper Award,” APSA Formal Theory Section

  3. The Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade, with Ian Turner
    American Journal of Political Science, 2026, 70(1): 120-135

  4. Financial Regulatory Cycles: A Political Economy Model, with Pooya Almasi and Jihad Dagher
    Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2025, 63: 101164

  5. Bending the Iron Law, with Giovanna Invernizzi
    American Journal of Political Science, 2025, 69(2): 748-762

  6. Theories of Democratic Backsliding, with Edoardo Grillo, Zhaotian Luo, and Monika Nalepa
    Annual Review of Political Science, 2024, 27: 381-400

  7. The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability, with Guy Grossman and Kristin Michelitch
    American Journal of Political Science, 2024, 68(3): 1022-1040
    Pre-Analysis PlanSupplemental AppendixPolicy Brief

  8. Reference Points and Democratic Backsliding, with Edoardo Grillo
    American Journal of Political Science, 2023, 67(1): 71-88
    Winner of the 2024 “Best Article Award,” APSA Formal Theory Section

  9. Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation in Representative Democracy, with Stephane Wolton
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 135: 86-95
    Supplemental Appendix

  10. Party Nomination Strategies in List Proportional Representation Systems, with Peter Buisseret, Olle Folke, and Johanna Rickne
    American Journal of Political Science, 2022, 66(3): 714-729
    An earlier version won the “CQ Press Award” for best paper on legislative studies at APSA 2018

  11. Competing Principals? Legislative Representation in List PR Systems, with Peter Buisseret
    American Journal of Political Science, 2022, 66(1): 156-170

  12. After Citizens United: How Outside Spending Shapes American Democracy, with Nour Abdul-Razzak and Stephane Wolton
    Electoral Studies, 2020, 67: 102-190
    Monkey cage postReplication Materials

  13. Voting Behavior under Proportional Representation, with Peter Buisseret
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020, 32(1): 96-111

  14. Self-Enforcing Partisan Procedures, with Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu
    Journal of Politics, 2020, 82(3): 937-954

  15. Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability, with Stephane Wolton
    Political Science Research and Methods, 2019, 7(1): 1-21
    Appendix – Blog post – Replication: Do, Dta (Stata 13) – Data construction: Do (Publicly available data sets: 1, 2, 3)

  16. Rational Ignorance, Populism, and Reform, with Stephane Wolton
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 55: 119-135
    Supplemental AppendixBlog post

  17. Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences, with Stephane Wolton
    Journal of Politics, 2018, 80(4): 1168-1182
    Supplemental Appendix

  18. Electoral Competition and Policy Feedback Effects
    Journal of Politics, 2018, 80(1): 195-210

  19. Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation, with Stephane Wolton
    Political Science Research and Methods, 2017, 5(3): 567-574

  20. The Hidden Cost of Direct Democracy, with Bruno Strulovici
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, 29(3): 440-466

  21. A Bargaining Model of Endogenous Procedures, with Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 47(4): 985–1012

  22. The Voters’ Curses: Why we Need Goldilocks Voters, with Stephane Wolton
    American Journal of Political Science, 2016, 60(3): 726-737
    Supplemental AppendixAdditional Proofs – Extensions

  23. Electoral Control and the Human Capital of Politicians, with Peter Buisseret
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 98: 34-55
    Blog post

  24. Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations, with Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu
    American Journal of Political Science, 2015, 54(4): 866-879
    Supplemental Appendix

Columbia

Teaching

Graduate formal theory and undergraduate political economy.

  • POLS GR8211 Political Economy of Institutions [PhD-level Formal Theory III] (syllabus)
  • POLS W4732 Research Topics in Game Theory [PhD-level Formal Theory II] (syllabus)
  • ECPS4921 Seminar in Political Economy [Senior Seminar] (syllabus)



An Overview of Ranked Choice Voting